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Abstract
Background: Hospitals are confronted with increasing safety demands from a diverse set of stakeholders, including
governmental organisations, professional associations, health insurance companies, patient associations and the
media. However, little is known about the effects of these institutional and competitive pressures on hospital safety
management. Previous research has shown that organisations generally shape their safety management approach
along the lines of control- or commitment-based management. Using a heuristic framework, based on the
contextually-based human resource theory, we analysed how environmental pressures affect the safety management
approach used by hospitals.
Methods: A qualitative study was conducted into hospital care in the Netherlands. Five hospitals were selected for
participation, based on organisational characteristics as well as variation in their reputation for patient safety. We
interviewed hospital managers and staff with a central role in safety management. A total of 43 semi-structured
interviews were conducted with 48 respondents. The heuristic framework was used as an initial model for analysing
the data, though new codes emerged from the data as well.
Results: In order to ensure safe care delivery, institutional and competitive stakeholders often impose detailed
safety requirements, strong forces for compliance and growing demands for accountability. As a consequence,
hospitals experience a decrease in the room to manoeuvre. Hence, organisations increasingly choose a control-
based management approach to make sure that safety demands are met. In contrast, in case of more abstract
safety demands and an organisational culture which favours patient safety, hospitals generally experience more
leeway. This often results in a stronger focus on commitment-based management.
Conclusions: Institutional and competitive conditions as well as strategic choices that hospitals make have resulted in
various combinations of control- and commitment-based safety management. A balanced approach is required. A
strong focus on control-based management generates extrinsic motivation in employees but may, at the same time,
undermine or even diminish intrinsic motivation to work on patient safety. Emphasising commitment-based
management may, in contrast, strengthen intrinsic motivation but increases the risk of priorities being set elsewhere.
Currently, external pressures frequently lead to the adoption of control-based management. A balanced approach
requires a shift towards more trust-based safety demands.
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Background
Healthcare organisations are confronted with increasing
safety demands from a diverse set of stakeholders [1], in-
cluding governmental organisations, professional associ-
ations, health insurance companies, patient associations
and the media. In this multidimensional or layered en-
vironment hospitals have to deal with various coexisting
institutional and competitive pressures [2, 3]. The systems
approach claims that these environmental conditions
influence the shaping of organisational policies and
procedures, which affect the work processes of health-
care professionals who try to provide the safest possible
care to their patients [4]. However, little empirical research
has been done on the actual consequences of various
environmental conditions for safety management in
healthcare [2].
Previous research has shown that organisations generally
shape their safety management approach along the lines of
control- or commitment-based management [5, 6]. The
former is a formalised, top-down approach that focuses on
regulating work processes, monitoring professional behav-
iours and providing employees with feedback on their level
of compliance [7, 8]. In contrast, commitment-based man-
agement focuses on facilitating an internalization of safety
norms and values in employees [6, 9], by creating aware-
ness of safety risks, stressing the priority of safety within
the organisation and encouraging employees’ ownership in
safety management [5]. Each approach might have its
merits in optimising safety [10], and both may be required
in professional organisations such as hospitals.
To understand the relationship between environmental
conditions and organisations’ management approach,
Paauwe developed the contextually-based human resource
(HR) theory [11, 12]. This framework describes how envir-
onmental conditions influence the shaping of HR manage-
ment, incorporating institutional pressures, competitive
drivers, and the historically grown configuration of an or-
ganisation. Moreover, it combines a systems approach
with an actor perspective that stresses the role of strategic
agency within organisations. Depending on the room to
manoeuvre that organisations experience, the individuals
or groups who hold decision-making power within the
organisation (i.e., the dominant coalition) may opt for
various strategically chosen responses while shaping
management policies and procedures [13]. In this article
we will adapt this framework to patient safety, since envir-
onmental conditions and strategic responses of organisa-
tions are considered to be issue-specific [14].
Management policies and practices are, first, subject to
the influences of institutional mechanisms. Institutions
reflect sets of rules, norms or belief systems which provide
stability and meaning to social life [15], and which are “the
rules of the game” that direct and control organisational
behaviour [16]. According to new institutionalism [17],
organisations conform to these institutional pressures in
order to gain legitimacy and to improve their chances of
survival [18, 19]. As a consequence organisations acting in
similar contexts become more and more homogeneous.
This isomorphic change results from three mechanisms
[17]. First, coercive mechanisms derive from cultural
expectations in society and (in)formal pressures from
institutions on which the organisations are dependent.
Prototypically, stakeholders such as governmental agen-
cies demand organisations to adopt specific practices
and have the ability to punish non-compliance. Second,
mimetic mechanisms originate from uncertainty which
drives organisations towards imitating practices of success-
ful competitors or ‘best practices’. Finally, normative
mechanisms arise from professionalization as professional
networks and training programs develop and spread pro-
fessional norms and values.
Whereas seeking legitimacy may drive organisations
towards institutional isomorphism, an economic rational-
ity of efficiency and effectiveness, may steer organisations
either in the direction of competitive isomorphism or
towards differentiation. Exposure to similar market
conditions and endeavours to improve efficiency or to
keep up with competitors may lead to similarities in or-
ganisational practices and systems [17]. Organisations
may, for example, benchmark themselves against each
other and imitate competitors’ policies and practices
which are promising for delivering desirable outcomes.
However, strategic management scholars advocate that
organisations should ‘be different’ in order to gain a
competitive advantage [20, 21]. The transition to regulated
competition through market-oriented healthcare reforms
forces hospitals to compete on both quality and price,
which may stimulate them to differentiate based on safety
management and performance.
In addition to influences of institutional and competitive
mechanisms, the historically grown configuration of an
organisation has a role in shaping management policies
and practices as well [11]. The configuration reflects a
unique path-dependent pattern of organisational charac-
teristics, structures, competences and values, which is also
referred to as the administrative heritage [22]. According
to Delery & Doty’s configurational approach, organisations
need to align their management policies and practices
with the administrative heritage in order to be effective
[23]. Veld studied the historical configuration of hospitals
in the Netherlands and found that it is characterised by
ongoing mergers and reorganisations, a highly professio-
nalised workforce, status differences between disciplines,
and the autonomous position of medical specialists [24].
In the Netherlands, the majority of medical specialists are,
for example, employed in independent partnerships and
hold a relatively independent position in the managerial
hierarchy, making it hard to control their behaviours.
Alingh et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2018) 18:313 Page 2 of 14
Nevertheless, they have considerable formal and informal
power in hospital policy and management, since the
hospital needs their commitment in order to achieve its
objectives.
How the dominant coalition deals with these environ-
mental conditions depends on the room to manoeuvre
or leeway that organisations experience to opt for various
strategic responses. The dominant coalition may mitigate
the relationship between environmental conditions and
the organisation by obtaining a degree of leeway for
shaping management policies and practices. This room
to manoeuvre is affected by several factors, including
the financial health of the organisation [25], the depend-
ency relationships with external stakeholders [13], and ac-
tors’ sense-making of environmental pressures and their
interpretation of what is considered appropriate behaviour
[26]. Moreover, internal dynamics in the dominant coali-
tion in terms of interests, values and power dependencies
may also influence the room to manoeuvre to make
strategic choices [27]. According to the strategic balance
theory [28], organisations make strategic choices “to be
[either] more differentiated from or more similar to its
competitors” in order to achieve a balance between re-
quirements of stakeholders, pressures for legitimization
and competition [29]. Hence, although institutional
pressures have the power to force organisations to
adopt certain practices, actors within the organisation
still have ample room to enact agency [30]. Oliver dis-
tinguishes five manifestations of organisational agency
[13]. First, organisations could passively conform to in-
stitutional requirements. Second, under conditions of
conflicting demands or inconsistencies between external ex-
pectations and internal objectives, organisations could com-
promise by balancing or bargaining the demands. Moreover,
they may choose to buffer or decouple themselves from in-
stitutional pressure by ‘ceremonial’ implementation; pre-
tending conformity without true believe or shared values by
the members of the organisation [19]. In other words, cere-
monial implementation concerns relatively high levels of im-
plementation accompanied by low levels of internalisation
[14]. The fourth strategic response is a more active form of
resistance in which organisations ignore, challenge or attack
institutional norms and expectations. And finally, organisa-
tions may choose to manipulate demands by a purposeful
and opportunistic attempt to co-opt, influence, or control
institutional pressures [13]. Formulated in a more positive
way, they have the opportunity to ‘lead’, ‘initiate’ or ‘develop’
strategic responses to environmental demands [11], or they
may seek to bring about institutional change; also referred
to as institutional entrepreneurship [31]. Hence, actors
within an organisation who have an interest in particular in-
stitutional arrangements may exercise power and attempt to
actively transform existing institutional arrangements and
create new ones.
The aforementioned organisational responses imply that,
in the end, the dominant coalition makes strategic deci-
sions; thus, shaping management policies and practices.
The current study aims to develop a deeper understanding
how the combination of institutional, competitive and con-
figurational factors as well as internal issues of strategic
choice influences the shaping of safety management ap-
proaches of healthcare organisations. During a qualitative
study conducted in five hospitals in the Netherlands,
Paauwe’s contextually-based HR theory is used as a heuris-
tic framework (see Fig. 1) [11, 12].
Methods
We selected five hospitals in the Netherlands, based on
organisational characteristics as well as their variation in
reputation for patient safety. We interviewed hospital man-
agers and staff with a central role in safety management.
According to the Dutch law, no ethical approval was re-
quired from a Medical Ethical Committee [32].
Research setting
Hospital care in the Netherlands is delivered in private,
not-for-profit care organisations. Since the introduction
of the Health Insurance Act in 2006, the organisations
are subject to a system of so-called regulated competition.
On the one hand, health insurers purchase healthcare and
negotiate with providers on both quality and price, while
on the other hand the government governs at a distance
in order to guarantee universal access to high-quality care
[33]. As a result, hospitals are subject to a wide variety of
requirements which may influence how they manage pa-
tient safety.
In 2013, a total of 89 Dutch hospitals existed, which
could be categorized into university medical centres,
top-clinical teaching hospitals and general hospitals [34].
A combination of general and top-clinical teaching hos-
pitals were considered for inclusion in the study (see
Table 1); university medical centres were excluded be-
cause of the great degree of organisational complexity of
these organisations (including research and education).
Moreover, variation was sought in hospital size as well
as organisations’ safety performances. Performance scores
were derived from publicly available ranking lists (i.e.,
Elsevier rankings) and consisted of a combined score of
various safety performance indicators (e.g., process indica-
tors on patient identification and the screening of pressure
ulcers). Since the ranking lists have been criticised for
fluctuation over time [35], the scores of three successive
years have been combined. The five participating hospitals
were selected using stratified purposeful sampling [36],
and provided a reflection of the variation in hospital
size and safety reputation across all Dutch general and
top-clinical teaching hospitals.
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Data collection
In order to gain deep insights into the phenomenon of
interest, semi-structured interviews were conducted with
respondents who occupy a central role in safety manage-
ment and who work at different hierarchical levels
within the organisation [37]. From September 2013 to
April 2014, a total of 43 interviews were conducted with
48 respondents (some interviews were duo-interviews),
including (chief ) patient safety officers, members of the
board of directors, members of the medical advisory
board, medical managers, business unit managers and
nurse managers or team leaders (see Table 2). All of the
respondents were (directly) involved in safety manage-
ment and could give insight into the reasons underlying
the choice for different safety management approaches.
By purposefully selecting respondents who hold different
managerial positions and work at different hierarchical
levels we aimed to gain broad insight into varying view-
points in the dominant coalition on how internal and ex-
ternal contextual features combine to influence the
shaping of safety management approaches across hierarch-
ical levels. After all, how strategic-level managers respond
to institutional, competitive and configurational factors
might differ from the choices made by managers at tactical
or operational hospital levels.
The interviews were structured around the constructs
underlying the contextually-based HR theory [11, 12].
Respondents were, first, asked to describe how patient
safety is managed and what safety interventions are ap-
plied in their department or hospital. Subsequently, the
interview addressed environmental conditions and rele-
vant trends in the hospital context that might have influ-
enced the safety management approach. Respondents
were, for example, asked what developments took place
in the healthcare context (e.g., institutional or competitive
mechanisms) or in their own organisation that might have
influenced how they manage patient safety. In addition,
the interview focused on how these developments affected
the safety management approach and how organisations
respond to environmental conditions; in other words, did
hospitals experience room to manoeuvre? Finally, respon-
dents were asked to elaborate on why hospitals opted for
specific strategic responses in reaction to demands from
stakeholders in their environment.
Fig. 1 Heuristic framework, based on the contextually-based HR theory [11, 12]
Table 1 Case characteristics of the five hospitals
Hospital A Hospital B Hospital C Hospital D Hospital E
Type of hospital Top-clinical Top-clinical General General Top-clinical
Hospital size (no. of beds) < 500 750–1000 500–750 500–750 > 1000
Safety performance* Low Low Low Mediocre High
*Safety performance has been reported on a scale that ranges from 1 to 4. Scores < 2 are indicated as low, scores of 2–3 are indicated as mediocre and scores > 3
are indicated as high
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Data analysis
All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed ver-
batim. The transcripts were analysed using qualitative
data analysis software Atlas.ti to conduct a thematic ana-
lysis. First, the researchers familiarised themselves with
the data by (re)reading transcripts and identifying “pat-
terns of meaning and issues of potential interest in the
data” [38]. Second, initial codes were generated to iden-
tify topics of interest. To identify codes, deductive- and
inductive-coding were combined. The initial list of codes
consisted of key-elements of the conceptual framework
[11, 12], and included codes such as ‘competitive mecha-
nisms’, ‘dominant coalition’, and ‘room to manoeuvre’.
However, the researchers remained open for codes that
emerged from the data and searched for specifications of
initial codes. For example, the initial code ‘competitive
mechanisms’ covered elements such as ‘purchasing
healthcare by insurance companies’, ‘publically available
ranking lists’ and ‘benchmarking’. Whereas the initial
code ‘room to manoeuvre’ was further specified by fac-
tors which influence the experienced leeway, such as
‘tightness of external supervision’ and ‘relevance of safety
requirements’. Furthermore, new codes emerged from
the data, such as ‘critical safety incidents’. In the end, all
codes were combined into broader (sub)themes, which
were based on similarities in data as well as theory. The
final themes structure the results presented in this
paper. In the results section, respondents are referred to
as codes corresponding with the letters and numbers for
hospitals and functions as mentioned in Table 2.
Results
Dominant coalition shapes safety management
Although the formal responsibility rests with the board
of directors, all hospitals in this study established a struc-
ture of shared responsibilities and joint decision-making
on hospital-wide safety policies and practices: “Together
with the board of directors, the medical advisory board
takes decisions on many organisational issues. For all
topics related to the national programme ‘Prevent Harm,
Work Safely’, an action plan is, for example, presented
which is approved by both of them” (C1). Medical special-
ists have a powerful voice in these decision-making pro-
cesses, especially in case of care-related matters such as
patient safety. “There is no board of directors of a Dutch
hospital who does something that doctors don’t want to,
because then your days as a board member are simply
numbered” (A3). Remarkably, nurses, who have a central
role in care delivery and who form a significant part of the
hospital staff, are not closely involved in shaping hospital-
wide safety policies and practices.
With regard to departmental safety issues, a similar pat-
tern of shared responsibilities was found. “Together with
the medical manager, as a duo we are responsible for tak-
ing care of and ensuring patient safety [in our depart-
ment]” (E4). Departmental safety policies and practices are
deeply influenced by choices made at the hospital level.
Nonetheless, business unit managers, medical managers
and nurse managers still have some leeway for shaping
safety management within their own department.
Institutional demands
The studied hospitals are subject to coercive pressures
resulting from requirements and expectations of the
Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate, safety legislations, govern-
ment initiatives and accreditation committees. The Dutch
Healthcare Inspectorate has, for example, the authority to
keep hospitals under ‘stringent supervision’ or even close
a department or organisation that does not meet safety
requirements. “If the inspectorate takes steps to enforce
compliance and you do not follow a guideline […], they
say you do not work safely or you work on the brink of
what is considered acceptable. Then the inspectorate en-
forces you to improve things within a month, or the de-
partment will be closed” (B1). In line with this, the
inspectorate supervises hospitals by undertaking site
visits and by discussing safety performance indicators
which provide insight into the safety of care processes.
Rather than punishing non-compliance, hospitals may
also be forced in more subtle ways to meet safety require-
ments. For example, hospital accreditations let independ-
ent committees check whether hospitals comply with a
set of (minimum) safety standards. These accreditations
shifted from voluntary participation to a required standard
in order to gain legitimacy in the hospital field. Something
similar is the case for the national programme ‘Prevent
Harm, Work Safely’ which was a joint initiative of the gov-
ernment and professional associations, offering hospitals
Table 2 Number of respondents per function
Hospital A Hospital B Hospital C Hospital D Hospital E Total
1. (Chief) patient safety officer 1 2 3 1 1 8
2. Board of directors 1 1 1 1 1 5
3. Medical manager/advisory board 2 2 2 4 4 14
4. Business unit manager 2 2 1 0 2 7
5. Nurse manager/team leader 4 2 2 3 3 14
Total 10 9 9 9 11 48
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tools and best practices for certain high-risk patient safety
problems like surgical site infections or medication errors.
Whereas the programme was primarily intended to en-
courage safety improvement, hospitals were eventually
expected to adopt specific practices and to reach ac-
creditation on how they manage safety risks. “When
you combine the national programme ‘Prevent Harm,
Work Safely’ with a system of auditing and accrediting
hospitals, there is no escape anymore” (D2). So, the
choices of the dominant coalition are, first of all, influ-
enced by coercive pressures resulting from expectations
of the organisational field and demands from stake-
holders that have the ability to enforce certain safety
behaviours.
Secondly, safety management is also influenced by nor-
mative mechanisms deriving from professional norms and
regulations. In professional training programmes, health-
care professionals are socialised to strive for safe care, to
work fairly independent of external control mechanisms
and to rely on self-judgement. As a result, “Every doctor is
convinced that he delivers high-quality care and that he
works safely. […] It is a very isolated world, the medical
world” (B3). Moreover, medical professional associations
establish evidence-based clinical protocols and guidelines
on how to deliver safe care: “All rules of the game concern-
ing patient safety are established by our professional asso-
ciations, […] for example on how to apply hand hygiene”
(B1). These normative regulations do not only contribute
to safety management in itself, some of them are also
adopted by the Healthcare Inspectorate or accreditation
committees which enforce compliance with the protocols
or guidelines.
Finally, the studied hospitals do also use mimetic
mechanisms by seeking inspiration from other high-risk
industries while shaping safety management. For example,
different hospitals are inspired by successful initiatives
from aviation or petrochemical industry. “One of the ac-
tions that is currently taken is that I will try to find a way
to change the speaking up culture together with the guy
who is running the speaking up project at Shell” (E3).
Competitive mechanisms
The choices made by the dominant coalition are also af-
fected by competitive mechanisms deriving from the
healthcare market. First, health insurers play a major
role in the healthcare market, since they negotiate with
hospitals on both quality and price of the care that is
provided: “They [health insurers] do not purchase certain
types of care if you do not meet their quality standards”
(C2). As a result of the dominance of health insurers,
hospitals typically experience little leeway to deviate
from their safety requirements. Even though, hospitals
generally experience that insurers mostly focus on finan-
cial aspects and cost reduction: “Health insurers state
that quality and safety are really important, but in the
meantime they negotiate till there is no meat left on the
bone” (C1). As a consequence, hospitals are on the one
hand stimulated to focus on patient safety, while on the
other hand they experience limited financial resources to
allocate to safety management.
In addition, hospitals do also feel a sense of urgency to
work on patient safety because patients become better
informed and critical customers, since news and social
media report on serious safety incidents, patient experi-
ences and ranking lists on hospitals’ quality and safety.
A bad reputation of a hospital reflects badly on the pro-
fessionals involved: “Doctors don’t like to explain at a
birthday party why they, as a hospital, are number 88
[in a top 100 ranking list]” (B3). Negative publicity may
also have more serious consequences in the current
Dutch market system: “If we do not provide good care we
will not get any clients or patients. Then the hospital will
earn no money” (C3).
Thirdly, safety management is also influenced by in-
spiration drawn from comparisons with competitors. Al-
though benchmarking patient safety data is not yet
common sense on hospital level, some intensive care
units and surgical departments do compare their safety
processes and outcomes with similar departments in
other hospitals, sometimes even internationally. “Espe-
cially in orthopaedics, infection rates are closely moni-
tored and also compared with comparable hospitals. […]
In case our infection rates are lower, great, how can we
further improve our performances? When our rates are
higher, guys what is happening, what is going wrong
here?” (A5). Thus, a poor benchmark outcome motivates
professionals to improve their safety performances and
to learn from competitors.
Finally, hospitals’ attempts to differentiate themselves
from competitors may also affect how they manage pa-
tient safety. In general, hospitals say they do not feel a
strong need to differentiate themselves regarding patient
safety, since patient safety is considered a basic require-
ment for providing healthcare. “In our opinion, we
should not compete for quality or safety, because the
quality and safety should be guaranteed [in all hospi-
tals], we do not want to use it for competitive advantage”
(D2). Nevertheless, hospitals did start to make a name
for themselves. Two hospitals try, for example, to dem-
onstrate greater openness and transparency than their
competitors about the safety and outcomes of provided
care. Moreover, most hospitals try to differentiate them-
selves by devoting attention to specific groups of pa-
tients. “We pretend to be a hospital for elderly. Well, you
cannot pretend this when your performance on the pre-
vention of pressure ulcers is so disappointing.” (C2). In
line with this, all studied hospitals try to gain specific
quality marks (e.g., for frail elderly) that may serve as a
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marketing tool for the care that the organisation delivers.
So, the strategic choices of a hospital also influence their
safety management.
Experienced room to manoeuvre
How the dominant coalition deals with the institutional
and competitive environment is influenced by the room
to manoeuvre that a hospital experiences, which is in
turn affected by hospital’s interpretation of safety require-
ments from external stakeholders as well as characteristics
of the historically grown configuration of an organisation.
An important factor that influences the experienced
room to manoeuvre is the tightness of external supervi-
sion. If external stakeholders impose more frequent or
unexpected supervisory controls, hospitals face a higher
risk of disclosure of non-compliance, leading to actions
that might harm the organisation. Given the fact that
hospitals want to reach accreditation, they experience,
for example, little room to manoeuvre at the time of an
accreditation visit; at that moment, they all try to perfectly
meet the safety requirements. However, once a hospital is
accredited, the experienced room to manoeuvre increases
since the accreditation committee will not perform safety
checks again until a next accreditation visit. As a nurse
manager (A5) explained: “In case of an accreditation visit,
all of a sudden [all policies and procedures] are in order,
but when the accreditation committee has left, everything
collapses into a heap again”. Comparably, departments in
two of the studied hospitals were recently kept under close
supervision of the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate and ex-
perienced little room to manoeuvre: “Our hospital has
been checked by the Inspectorate and, at first, they did not
give approval. […] Well, know that a manager visited our
department and said make sure that everyone complies
with all requirements, otherwise the hospital will be in big
trouble” (B5). In contrast, a recent positive evaluation
could increase the experienced room to manoeuvre: “Now
that the Inspectorate is satisfied [with our performances]
they may focus their attention to other hospitals” (E3).
In addition, the experienced room to manoeuvre is
also determined by the consequences of not meeting
safety requirements (e.g., in terms of legitimacy or finan-
cial health). All studied hospitals feel a strong need to
comply with requests made by health insurers, since the
financial situation of a hospital is largely dependent on
insurers’ willingness to purchase healthcare. “For a
while, I thought I am not going to respond [to all requests
made by health insurers], but I have been rebuked by
some members of the organisation who said, and they
are right though, we have to get our money from that
club” (A2). In contrast, hospitals do also face external
safety demands for which it is less obvious that the re-
quirements have to be met. The consequences of not
gaining a specific quality mark are, for example, less
harmful for an organisation; thus, members of the dom-
inant coalition experience more leeway to strategically
choose whether they want to meet the criteria that such
quality marks entail or not. “Some quality marks are
really important, but there are also a few that have little
added value. […] Therefore, when a new quality mark is
introduced we have to assess whether we want to gain it,
[…] what are the costs and what are the benefits?” (A4).
The room to manoeuvre that the dominant coalition
experiences is also influenced by the perceived relevance
and practicality of demands that are imposed on the or-
ganisation. All studied hospitals employ a highly profes-
sionalised workforce that is socialised to strive for
error-free care delivery and is professionally driven to
improve patient safety. Hence, the more relevant a re-
quirement is perceived to be, the less room to manoeuvre
the dominant coalition experiences. “If you are able to
show that a lot of errors are made on a specific issue and
that you have found a manner to actually avoid major er-
rors, to avoid clinically relevant errors, then I think you
will not hear anyone” (D3). Thus, the perceived relevance
depends on how serious safety problems are and how ef-
fective the safety requirements are perceived to be. More-
over, if hospitals face concrete and detailed safety
requirements that can be easily incorporated in standard
work processes they experience less room to manoeuvre.
Finally, the experienced room to manoeuvre is also
affected by the historically grown configuration (i.e., the
outcome of choices and responses to issues that the or-
ganisation had to deal with in the past). More specific-
ally, it is influenced by the existence of a safety culture
in which hospitals favour patient safety over other or-
ganisational aspects (e.g., production or finance). Some
of the studied hospitals devote high priority to patient
safety, because safety is closely linked with their organ-
isational heritage or because of critical incidents in the
past. A couple of years ago, one of the studied hospitals
was, for example, confronted with media attention on
hygiene problems as well as a persistent hospital infection.
These incidents triggered awareness of patient safety and
gave safety efforts new urgency and greater priority within
the organisation. “Of course, it was terrible that we were
visited by a television show that used a hidden camera
[which revealed hygiene problems], but it caused an enor-
mous cultural change. […] Everyone was well aware that
certain things had to change” (E5). Hence, a culture was
fostered in which the hospital strived for ongoing im-
provements in patient safety and nowadays the dominant
coalition experiences more leeway to put their own spin
on how they manage safety issues. This is in contrast with
hospitals that are confronted with issues that distract their
attention from patient safety, such as financial problems, a
fall in production or a merger. Because of these issues,
two of the studied hospitals gave priority to dealing with
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the financial situation of the organisation – “Ninety per-
cent of our time we talk about money and about budget
cuts” (B2). They experienced little room to manoeuvre;
unless it would help them to save time that was spent on
patient safety.
Strategic responses
Depending on the room to manoeuvre that hospitals
experience, the dominant coalition has a choice from
various strategic responses (e.g., compliance, balancing
or initiating change) on how they deal with external
safety requirements. Whether the experienced room to
manoeuvre is actually utilized depends on two things.
First, the motivation and individual agency shown by
members of the dominant coalition – in other words,
do individuals have a personal drive to work on patient
safety, do they feel responsible and do they dare to take
a risk by deviating from external safety requirements.
Second, the occurrence of safety incidents or near mis-
ses (i.e., unintended safety events that did not cause in-
jury or damage to a patient, but that had the potential
to do so) that trigger awareness for safety issues in the
organisation at short notice.
The results of this study show that all studied hospitals
comply with the majority of external demands regarding
patient safety, both in terms of adopting safety practices
or procedures and by providing required information for
external accountability. However, different levels of com-
pliance can be distinguished. In general, we found that
hospitals fully comply with safety requirements if the di-
rectives are considered relevant and valuable for improv-
ing patient safety. “Things like the surgical time-out
procedure were imposed top-down, but they do contribute
to reducing safety problems. They clearly cover a weak
spot. […, so, that is something of which] we say, we just
have to do it” (D3). Full compliance with safety direc-
tives is also fostered by tight external supervision and
serious consequences if requirements are not met.
Moreover, it is facilitated if internal representatives of
the various stakeholders actively support and stimulate
the adoption of safety practices. Medical specialists who
are in favour of certain safety improvements have, for
example, an important role in gaining acceptance among
their peers.
All studied hospitals also try to balance the useful direc-
tives of external stakeholders with the needs and practical
experiences of their own employees, as they give health-
care professionals the opportunity to customise practices
and procedures in order to fit the local circumstances. “If
really good arguments are presented of which healthcare
professionals say this in particular makes things difficult,
or we think we can arrange things better that way, […]
then a protocol […] or procedure can be modified” (C5).
Modifications are mostly made in case of low practicality.
Respondents argue, for example, that some of the
evidence-based clinical protocols and guidelines issued
by medical professional associations are so detailed and
prescriptive that they do not always work out in practice.
“Clinical guidelines are rather frequently established by
some kind of desk officers. These persons do work in hospi-
tals, but often in academic centres which typically might
be somewhat more precise in working conform evidence
[…]. However, maybe not always having medical practice
in mind, especially of hospitals that treat a great amount
of patients” (E2). As a result, proposed safety requirements
are not always in line with local circumstances in a hos-
pital and may, consequently, lead to resistance to conform.
Therefore, all studied hospitals offer their professionals
the possibility to modify certain parts of the protocols and
guidelines if they present good arguments to do so.
In addition, ceremonial implementation of safety re-
quirements is used on a regular basis in all studied hospi-
tals. Hospitals simply try to meet external requirements
without fully acknowledging and internalising the need for
these practices, because they are not so much willing or
able to devote time and efforts to adopting certain prac-
tices. “We noticed that, if we once again receive a new
evaluation framework, we somewhat forced start ticking
the boxes. […] A bit like we have to comply with this one,
and this, and that, rather than thinking through the risks
involved” (E2). Ceremonial implementation is also demon-
strated by required policies and procedures that do exist
on paper, while the underlying changes in safety manage-
ment or professional behaviours are not fully put into
practice. “On the outside, all policies and procedures show
that we have things in order […], the bureaucrats here in
the hallway do as much as they can. However, how are
things experienced at the shop floor? Well, that is a prob-
lem” (B2). This form of ceremonial implementation is
chosen if supervisory agencies check whether hospitals
established certain (written) procedures, of which health-
care professionals within the organisation consider the
practical relevance to be low. Given the fact that organisa-
tions do not want to face sanctions, they choose for cere-
monial implementation.
Overall, the studied hospitals do not give the impres-
sion that they often ignore or actively challenge safety
demands. Even though hospitals do complain about the
multitude and detail of safety requirements, they feel
that it is almost impossible to abandon required prac-
tices and procedures because of the consequences of not
meeting demands and since it is hard to offer collective
resistance. However, on a small scale, some hospitals or
departments do ignore safety requirements which they
consider to be irrelevant. “We had to develop a checklist
on how to insert a central venous catheter line [in order
to avoid infections …] but we had zero sepsis, for many
years already! Then I said I am not going to make a
Alingh et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2018) 18:313 Page 8 of 14
checklist, I refuse to do so” (D5). Moreover, some hospi-
tals develop and discuss alternative approaches to miti-
gate identified safety risks: “[Some safety procedures
include] elements where we deliberately deviate from ex-
ternal requirements. […] We also discuss these things
with the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate, […] we just want
to provide them with feedback on our practical experi-
ences and how we arrange things differently” (E2).
Whether the dominant coalition undertakes such initia-
tives depends on the experienced room to manoeuvre.
Hospitals that are highly dependent on approval of ex-
ternal stakeholders will not so easily challenge or ignore
their requirements. In contrast, hospitals that recently
received credits for their safety efforts and that give high
priority to patient safety will more easily dare to stand
out and will make more use of the experienced room to
manoeuvre to challenge external safety requirements.
Finally, hospitals choose to take initiative in formulat-
ing and reshaping their safety management approach.
Taking initiative requires room to manoeuvre and a pro-
active role of members of the dominant coalition; char-
acteristics that are often not so much fostered by exter-
nal safety requirements. “Organisations are increasingly
pushed to take their own responsibility. However, this
presupposes trust, whereas basically all imposed safety
systems are created based on distrust” (D2). Thus, initiat-
ing safety-related change assumes an intrinsic motiv-
ation to work on patient safety. In all studied hospitals,
safety incidents or poor benchmark outcomes stimulate
both healthcare professionals and members of the dom-
inant coalition to implement safety policies and proce-
dures that are not covered by or go beyond external
requirements. “We found out that, [compared to other
hospitals], we had a higher chance of some kind of infec-
tion, which is really bad for a patient. Well, that
launches a big drive to say we just have to set out very
strict rules […], and we actually have to be even more
strict than all those external requirements” (E2). The de-
gree to which further safety initiatives are developed var-
ies across hospitals, based on the priority attached to
patient safety and the level of individual agency shown
by members of the dominant coalition. If hospitals have
a culture which favours patient safety and when individ-
uals in the organisation have a strong personal motiv-
ation, they take more initiative to put their own spin on
how they manage several safety issues.
Safety management approach
Different combinations of environmental conditions and
strategic responses stimulate the adoption of either a
control- or a commitment-based management approach.
The dominant coalition tends to adopt a control-based
management approach when they experience little room
to manoeuvre and expect healthcare professionals to
lack the intrinsic motivation to comply with safety re-
quirements. Concrete and practicable safety requirements
that are accompanied by tight external supervision and
serious consequences when requisites are not met, are fre-
quently incorporated in internal planning and control cy-
cles and mostly give rise to a control-based management
approach. “Once every three months, we discuss the indica-
tors [for which we are accountable to external stake-
holders] with the board of directors. […] And if these
indicators are not above the norm, then critical questions
will be asked about it” (C5). Especially, if professionals do
not show full commitment to safety requirements and if
compliance is not taken for granted, members of the dom-
inant coalition monitor and control healthcare profes-
sionals’ behaviour. “It all started with confidence that
healthcare professionals would comply. Then we started
monitoring, then we applied sanctions. There is pressure
on it. It is mandatory. We impose controls and provide
people with feedback” (B5). In line with this, a control-
based management approach is mostly used if the domin-
ant coalition makes the strategic choice to comply with or
ceremonially implement safety requirements. Finally, only
in exceptional cases, where the dominant coalition experi-
ences high urgency or strong pressure that healthcare pro-
fessionals have to comply, sanction policies are used as
part of a control-based approach. A business unit manager
describes, for example, that they established sanction pol-
icies for hand hygiene compliance, because evidence had
recurrently shown that good hand hygiene provides a
sound basis for infection prevention. “[When it comes to
hand hygiene], you may push the boundaries twice, the
third time you face a warning and the fourth time you will
be fired. That is how important safety is for me. That is
how much conforming to the norm is worth for me” (A4).
In contrast, a commitment-based management approach
is generally chosen if the dominant coalition expects safety
requirements to generate an intrinsic motivation in health-
care professionals or when they experience plenty room to
manoeuvre. If safety requirements are underlined by strong
evidence or really target a clinically relevant issue, the
dominant coalition typically assumes that a commitment-
based management approach will effectively stimulate em-
ployees’ intrinsic motivation. Hence, the focus is on raising
awareness of safety risks and explaining the relevance of
safety practices. “In the end, you want your patients to leave
the hospital alive and healthy, they shouldn’t be harmed at
all. So, I think that is the main motivation, often you only
have to explain why you do certain things […] You have to
talk a lot about safety matters” (C3). Furthermore, the
dominant coalition tends to adopt a commitment-based
approach in case of safety demands that are difficult to put
into concrete and controllable rules or regulations, and
which therefore provide more room to manoeuvre. This is,
for example, the case for so-called ‘soft skills’ such as
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speaking up behaviour. Speaking up behaviour is hard to
enforce and the dominant coalition mostly tries to inspire
healthcare professionals to express safety concerns or ques-
tions: “On the one hand, you have to build awareness
among nurses that they do have knowledge which they
should use [in their collaboration with co-workers, in order
to reduce safety risks], while on the other hand you should
support them, show role modelling behaviour and empha-
sise that speaking up behaviour is something that we believe
is really important” (E5). Moreover, commitment-based
management is used if the medical knowledge and specific
expertise of healthcare professionals is needed to minimise
safety risks or to put abstract external safety requirements
into practicable safety procedures. “As a manager, I can, of
course, state that we score above or below a national aver-
age, but I cannot translate things into practical actions.
What do we have to change in order to improve our safety
performances? Well, that should really come from our em-
ployees, they have the expertise” (B4). In these circum-
stances, the dominant coalition tries to stimulate healthcare
professionals to proactively come up with new ideas for
safety improvement by encouraging employees’ sense of
ownership of patient safety and by actively inviting
them to make safety recommendations. Finally, the adop-
tion of commitment-based management approach does
also require congruence with an organisational culture
in which patient safety is prioritised at all organisational
levels.
Even though control- and commitment-based man-
agement represent the opposite ends of a managerial
spectrum, it never is an ‘either-or’ choice. Following
the wide variety of institutional, competitive and con-
figurational conditions as well as internal issues of
strategic choice that organisations face, most hospitals
simultaneously adopt elements of both management
approaches or they alternately introduce elements of
control- and commitment-based management in order
to ensure patient safety. If the dominant coalition
chooses, for example, to comply with safety require-
ments that they consider relevant, it depends on the
pressure exposed by external stakeholders and the con-
sequences that organisations face in case of non-
compliance whether the balance shifts towards either a
control- or a commitment-based management approach.
The greater the pressure that hospitals face, the higher the
chance that the dominant coalition chooses to monitor
and control healthcare professional behaviours rather than
relying on employees’ intrinsic motivation. Similarly, if
healthcare professionals are offered the possibility to
modify certain parts of externally exposed protocols or
guidelines in order to make them fit local circum-
stances, the dominant coalition initially tries to inspire
employees to work on patient safety and to encourage
their sense of ownership. However, if experience shows
that the modified safety requirements are not fulfilled
in practice, the dominant coalition may also choose to
combine a commitment-based management approach
with elements of control, or to shift the balance entirely
towards control-based safety management.
Discussion
This study aimed to develop a deeper understanding of
the effects of institutional, competitive and configurational
factors as well as internal issues of strategic choice on the
safety management approach of healthcare organisations.
Results showed that, in all studied hospitals, general man-
agers (e.g., board of directors, business unit managers and
nurse managers) and medical specialists have a shared
responsibility in decision-making processes on safety
policies and practices. The choices that this dominant
coalition makes while shaping safety management are
strongly influenced by demands from stakeholders in
the wider institutional environment and increasingly af-
fected by competitive mechanisms deriving from the
healthcare market. How the dominant coalition deals with
these safety requirements is influenced by the room to
manoeuvre that a hospital experiences. Little room to
manoeuvre is experienced when hospitals face tight exter-
nal supervision and serious consequences when safety
requisites are not met or if concrete and detailed safety re-
quirements are set that are perceived to be highly relevant.
Under these circumstances hospitals will mostly choose a
strategy of (passive) compliance; they just do what is re-
quired to be done. However, if safety demands are seen
as irrelevant, hospitals sometimes choose a form of
ceremonial implementation in which required policies
and procedures do exist on paper, while the underlying
changes in safety management or professional behaviours
are not fully put into practice. More leeway is experienced
if safety demands are abstract and the hospital has an or-
ganisational culture which favours patient safety. Hospitals
will in these circumstances often try to balance internal
and external demands, as they give healthcare profes-
sionals the opportunity to customise practices and proce-
dures in order to fit the local circumstances. Hospitals do
rarely ignore or challenge safety requirements, only when
they perceive ample room to manoeuvre and safety re-
quirements are either seen as irrelevant or very unpracti-
cal. The strategic choices hospitals make seem not only
dependent on the experienced room to manoeuvre, but
also on the motivation and individual agency of the dom-
inant coalition. Hospitals that take their own initiative in
formulating and reshaping their safety management ap-
proach are often those that experience leeway and in
which members of the dominant coalition play a proactive
role in prioritising patient safety. The occurrence of safety
incidents or near misses can be an important trigger for
this strategic response.
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These strategic responses do, in turn, stimulate the
adoption of either a control- or a commitment-based
management approach. The dominant coalition tends to
prefer a control-based approach when they experience
little room to manoeuvre and expect healthcare profes-
sionals to lack intrinsic motivation. Thus, if hospitals
face concrete and practicable safety requirements that
lack clinical relevance, but that are accompanied by tight
supervision and serious consequences if requisites are
not met, direct supervisors frequently monitor and con-
trol healthcare professional behaviours. In contrast, the
adoption of a commitment-based management approach
is generally chosen if the dominant coalition expects
safety requirements to generate intrinsic motivation in
healthcare professionals or when they experience plenty
of room to manoeuvre. Hence, if hospitals experience
clinically relevant safety requirements or abstract requi-
sites that are difficult to put into concrete and control-
lable regulations or require the specific expertise of
healthcare professionals to transform them into practic-
able safety procedures, supervisors mostly focus on
raising awareness of safety risks, explaining the rele-
vance of safety practices and stimulating participation
of healthcare professionals. Notwithstanding this di-
chotomy, following the wide variety of environmental
conditions as well as internal issues of strategic choice
that organisations face, all studied hospitals simultan-
eously or alternately apply elements of both manage-
ment approaches in order to ensure patient safety.
By analogy to the contextually-based HR theory [11, 12],
we established a framework for shaping safety manage-
ment in healthcare (see Fig. 2). In this sector, medical
specialists have a prominent role in shaping safety man-
agement, alongside managers and other staff. Despite
the fact that managers’ sphere of influence has been ex-
tended over the last years, healthcare professionals still
remain highly influential when it comes to their clinical
work and when their specific expertise is essential for
shaping effective practices and procedures [39]. Ensur-
ing patient safety has, thus, become a shared responsi-
bility of general managers and healthcare professionals.
Secondly, our findings add to the original framework
that, in case of patient safety, incidents or near-misses
frequently lead to ad-hoc modifications in safety pol-
icies and procedures. In HR management, critical inci-
dents and organisational scandals have been found to
affect the administrative heritage and accordingly influ-
ence the shaping of HR practices and procedures [40].
Yet, in case of patient safety, incidents typically induce
short-term learning processes in which organisations
investigate what happened and make changes in care
processes or safety management in order to reduce the
probability of recurrence of similar events. As a conse-
quence, safety incidents or near-misses are important trig-
gers for (re)shaping safety management on short notice.
Finally, several feedback loops between the environmental
conditions and the strategic choices of the dominant
coalition are to be expected. Poor safety outcomes may,
Fig. 2 Framework for contextually based safety management in healthcare
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for example, not only lead to ad-hoc modifications in
safety management but also give rise to new rules and
regulations established by medical professional associa-
tions [41, 42]. Furthermore, strategic responses of the
dominant coalition may also provoke reactions of exter-
nal stakeholders. If the dominant coalition chooses to
challenge or ignore external safety requirements, stake-
holders may tighten their supervision or broaden con-
sequences when demands are not met.
The institutional and competitive conditions presented
in this study show that, in order to ensure safe care de-
livery, external stakeholders often impose detailed safety
requirements, strong forces for compliance and growing
demands for accountability. These external regulations
have focused hospitals’ attention on patient safety and they
have led to intensified efforts to reduce safety incidents.
However, strict safety requirements may also have disad-
vantages. A strong focus on externally regulated compli-
ance and transparency generates extrinsic motivation in
employees but it may, at the same time, undermine or
even diminish intrinsic motivation to work on patient
safety [43]. This is further reinforced by the control-based
management approach that is generally preferred if hos-
pitals face great pressures from external stakeholders. A
control-based approach does strengthen employees’ ex-
trinsic motivation by providing directions and punishing
or rewarding employee behaviours [44]. It is however
contradictory to management control systems that are
traditionally used in professional organisations, which are
typically based on the intrinsic motivation and profes-
sional autonomy of healthcare professionals [45]. Further-
more, emphasis on compliance seems to lead to situations
in which some hospitals become primarily concerned with
conformity to external safety requirements, rather than
proactively dealing with safety risks that are important to
the organisation [46]. As a consequence, external regula-
tions may help to keep healthcare safe, but they may also
impede progress beyond a certain level [4]; especially in
organisations that do prioritise patient safety and that
spontaneously strive for excellence. Fostering a proactive
safety culture would require a more trust-based control
system and ample room to manoeuvre [46]. The Dutch
Healthcare Inspectorate and health insurers have recently
launched initiatives along these lines. They started intro-
ducing systems of so-called ‘horizontal inspection’ in
which organisations are granted exemption from tight
supervision after they have proven that self-regulations
ensures adequate (safety) performances [47, 48]. Thus, ex-
ternal stakeholders have made some first attempts to rely
more on trust rather than tight controls, which may, in
turn, reinforce the adoption of a commitment-based safety
management approach, increase intrinsic motivation in
healthcare professionals and stimulate hospitals to pro-
actively deal with safety risks.
This study has some limitations that support the need
for future research. First, only respondents in managerial
positions or with a leading role in safety management
within hospital organisations were interviewed. The focus
on intra-organisational actors is consistent with the ex-
plorative nature of this study and our aim to gain insight
into how organisations shape their safety management ap-
proach. However, in future research, it may be interesting
to include external stakeholders that impose safety re-
quirements on hospitals. This may help to gain broader
insight into the institutional and competitive mechanisms
that influence hospitals’ safety management approach by
identifying conditions that are overlooked by intra-
organisational actors (e.g., horizontal inspection) and it
may help to develop understanding of reciprocity be-
tween organisational responses and conditions in the
wider hospital environment (i.e., feedback loops in our
model). Second, the study exclusively focused on hospi-
tals in the Netherlands. Therefore, the generalizability
to other healthcare-contexts or other countries may be
low. However, Dutch hospitals can also be considered
an interesting case because they are subject to safety
demands from a diverse set of stakeholders in the institu-
tional and competitive environment [2], and they man-
aged to achieve a considerable reduction in preventable
deaths over the previous few years [49]. Future research
may examine which (combination of) management ap-
proach(es) contributes to the achievement of this result
and, more in general, what the effects of control- and
commitment-based management are on patient safety.
Conclusions
In conclusion, patient safety management requires a bal-
anced approach in which hospitals are encouraged to
combine both control- and commitment-based manage-
ment practices. Institutional and competitive pressures as
well as strategic choices that hospitals make, result in vari-
ous combinations of the safety management approaches.
The dominant coalition tends to prefer a control-based
approach when they experience little room to manoeuvre
and when they expect healthcare professionals to lack in-
trinsic motivation. The adoption of a commitment-based
management approach is generally chosen if the dominant
coalition expects safety requirements to generate intrinsic
motivation in healthcare professionals of when they ex-
perience plenty of room to manoeuvre. External pressures
mainly steer managers towards a control-based safety
management approach, which generates extrinsic motiv-
ation in employees but may, at the same time, undermine
or even diminish intrinsic motivation to work on patient
safety. Hence, external stakeholders should balance strong
forces for compliance with more trust-based safety de-
mands, consequently giving rise to both control- and
commitment-based safety management approaches.
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